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MB V Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [Case C-451/16]: Further Development from the 
European Court of Justice of rights for LGBTQ persons.  
In the case of MB v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions[Case C-451/16] [2018] Pens. L.R. 17, the 
European Court of Justice (‘CJEU’) determined that the requirement of the Gender Recognition Act 
2004 (‘GRA 2004’), which required trans persons to annul their marriage before they would be granted 
a full Gender Recognition Certificate in their new sex (prior to same-sex marriage being legalised in 
2013), which was also necessary to claim state pension benefits for women from the age of 60, 
contravened Article 4 Council Directive 79//7/EEC non-discrimination provisions. The consequence of 
the GRA 2004 provisions meant that many individuals never obtained gender recognition certificates 
as they did not want to annul their marriages. This subsequently meant that they could not exercise 
the right to claim the state pension at the lower age of 60 previously given to women (where men had 
to wait until 65). The far reaching judgment from the CJEU demonstrates again that the expanding 
nature of EU family law. The concept of EU citizenship is leading to an ever greater array of rights being 
given to EU citizens. Following Brexit UK citizens will no longer be able to benefit from such 
interventions from the CJEU.  
Introduction 
The case of MB v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [Case C-451/16] [2018] Pens. L.R. 17 (‘the 
MB case’) concerned a trans person who was born a male in 1948 and married in 1974. She 
subsequently underwent gender reassignment surgery in 1995. When she sought to claim her state 
pension at the age of 60 in 2008 she was rejected. At the time (prior to state pension reform) whilst 
women were entitled to access their pensions from the age of 60, men had to wait until 65 (s44 Social 
Security Contributions Act 1992 read in conjunction with s122 of that Act and with Schedule 4 
paragraph1 of the Pensions Act 1995). MB was rejected on the basis that the UK state still officially 
classified her as a male. This was because MB had never obtained a full Gender Recognition Certificate. 
MB had not completed this legal process because the Gender Recognition Act (‘GRA 2004’) in force at 
the time, prior to the legalisation of same-sex marriage in 2013, required a married applicant to annul 
their marriage. MB did not wish to annul her marriage.  
At the time the GRA was enacted in 2004 the UK had only legalised civil partnership, by way of the 
Civil Partnership Act 2004, and not same-sex marriage. In 2004 it was considered by some that 
although civil partnerships had given nearly the same legal rights to same-sex couples, that UK society 
was not ready for same-sex marriage. Jacqui Smith (then Deputy Minister for Women and Equality) 
stated in the House of Commons that ‘I recognise that Hon. Members on both sides of the House 
understand and feel very strongly about specific religious connotations of marriage’ (See Hansard, HC, 
12 October 2004, Col 177). The GRA 2004 therefore provided that in order to obtain a full gender 
recognition certificate not only did strict medical conditions have to be met but that also that a 
married applicant had to have their marriage annulled by the court (section 4(3) and section 5 GRA 
2004). This provision was only reformed following the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, 
Schedule 5 of which amended s4 GRA 2004 to provide that a full gender recognition certificate could 
be issued to a married applicant if their spouse consents.  
The original requirements of the GRA 2004 requiring a marriage to be annulled before a full gender 
recognition certificate could be issued required a very ‘painful and sensitive decision’ for many trans 
persons in stable marriages who had no desire to divorce (see for comment 
http://www.journalonline.co.uk/Magazine/54-10/1007115.aspx). Whilst a consequence of the Same 
Sex Marriage 2013 provisions is that ‘trans persons are no longer forced to choose between the legal 
recognition of their relationship or of their gender identity’ (See Charlotte Bendall, ‘Publication 
Review. From Civil Partnership to Same Sex Marriage: Interdisciplinary Reflections’ Eds, by Nicola 
Barker and Daniel Monk , Int. J.L.C. 2017, 13(3), 429-432 at page 430) the MB case demonstrates the 
continued impact of the previous legislation. MB’s case will be one of many where trans persons 
continue to be affected. Further in Northern Ireland whilst civil partnership legislation has been in 
force since 2004, there continues to be no recognition of same-sex marriage.  
Role of the European Court of Justice (‘CJEU’) 
In the MB case before the CJEU the question raised was whether the UK legislation was discriminatory 
on the grounds of sex, contrary to Article 4 of Council Directive 79/7/EEC. This directive provides that 
there should be a principle of equal treatment and ‘no discrimination whatsoever on ground of sex 
either directly or indirectly…’  On behalf of the UK Secretary of State for Work and Pensions the 
argument was made that it should be for Member States ‘to determine the conditions under which a 
person’s change of gender may be legally recognised’ (paragraph 23 MB judgment). It was argued that 
this should not only relate to physical and psychological criteria, but also criteria relating to marital 
status (paragraph 23 MB judgment). The UK government relied upon previous case law from the CJEU 
which  the UK government argued had accorded an area of discretion to Member State’s in this area 
(Judgement 7 January 2004, KB v NHS Pensions Agency (C-117-01) EU: C: 2004: 7 [2004] 1 CMLR 28 at 
paragraph 35 and of 27 April 2006, Richards v Secretary of State of Work and Pensions (C243-04) EU:C; 
2006: 256 [2006] 2 CMLR 49 at paragraph 21).  
According an area of discretion to Member States in sensitive areas of family law also reflects the 
position of the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’). Although the ECtHR has made important 
judgements in favour of recognising trans persons rights (for example see Christine Goodwin v UK 
Application 28957/95, Judgment of 11th July 2002) the ECtHR continues to allows Member States to 
make recognition of a change of gender conditional on annulment of that person’s marriage (16 July 
2014, Hamalainen v Finland (37359/09) [2015] 1 FCR 379 / 37 BHRC 55). In the related area of same-
sex marriage, ultimately the ECtHR has left this to the discretion of the Member State (Schalk and 
Kopf v Austria (App. No. 30141/04)). Although the ECtHR has recognised that a ‘co-habiting same-
sex couple living in a stable relationship’ fall under the notion of ‘family life’ (Schalk and Kopf v 
Austria at paragraph 94), and the ECtHR has accorded same-sex couples some right of legal protection, 
dependent upon the factual circumstances existing upon the ground of that member state (Oliari v 
Italy App Nos 18766/11 and 36030/11 (ECtHR, 31 July 2015), ultimately the ECtHR has stopped short 
of recognising same-sex marriage due to concerns about imposing upon Member States’ ‘deep rooted 
social and cultural’ concerns (Schalk and Kopf v Austria para 62). This in turn leads to a wide margin of 
appreciation, or area of discretion being granted to Member States (see Schalk and Kopf v Austria para 
105) when it comes to recognising same-sex marriage.  
However, although traditionally the EU has similarly always determined that subsidiarity should take 
precedence (see for instance commentary on art 9 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union which states that Member States do not have an ‘explicit requirement to facilitate 
[same-sex] marriages’) a recent case has demonstrated that the CJEU is prepared to make far reaching 
judgments in this area. In the case of C-673/16 Relu Adrian Coman and Others v Inspectoratul General 
pentru Imigrări and Others (‘Coman’) the CJEU determined that a non-EU citizen same-sex spouse 
should be granted the right of permanent residence when their EU citizen same-sex spouse relocated 
to a different state in the EU. This is the case even where the couple relocate to another jurisdiction 
(in the Coman case Romania) which does not allow any recognition of same-sex partnerships. 
Although the CJEU judgement in no way required EU states to recognise same-sex marriage, it has 
greatly enhanced EU free movement rights for same sex couples. It has also set a precedent for the 
CJEU in extending rights for same-sex couples and GLBTQ individuals more broadly.   
In MB the CJEU ultimately determined that although Member States continue to have authority and 
competence when determining matters of civil status and legal recognition of gender, Member States 
must exercise this authority in such a way to comply with provisions relating to the principle of non-
discrimination. In MB close examination was made by the CJEU of Article 4 of Directive 79/7 which 
prohibits all forms of discrimination on grounds of sex as regards social security. Ultimately the GRA 
section 4 conditions which required an annulment of marriage as a condition to access a state pension 
for persons who had changed sex, was considered to be direct discrimination on the grounds of sex 
(see MB paragraph 29). 
Conclusion 
The MB case is noteworthy on a number of different levels. The judgment itself extends the rights of 
trans persons who under the GRA 2004 were required to annul their marriages in order to access state 
retirement benefits from the age of 60 for women. As many trans persons, including the applicant in 
the MB case, did not wish to annul their marriages they were not able to obtain a Gender Recognition 
certificate or subsequently the state pension entitlements which all other women could access. This 
has been found by the CJEU to be direct discrimination contrary to Article 4 of Directive 79/7 which 
prohibits all forms of discrimination on grounds of sex as regards social security (see MB paragraph 
29). On another level the MB case alongside the recent Coman judgment represents a further 
intervention by the CJEU in the development of rights for LGBTQ individuals. This again demonstrates 
the ever expanding nature of EU family law. The concept of EU citizenship is leading to an ever greater 
array of rights being given to EU citizens. Following Brexit UK citizens will no longer be able to benefit 
from such interventions from the CJEU.  
 
